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Transparency and Efficiency to Yes: Support of the Application of Principled Evaluative 
Mediation In Property Holdout Situations 




Holdout property owners: who are they and what are their interests?  The answer 
to this, of course, is relative to which side defines the term, and will be more fully 
analyzed throughout this Comment.  Most fundamentally, however, holdout situations 
occur when existing landowners resist selling during “property assemblages” of multiple 
properties by either private developers or the government that occur for the purpose of a 
larger development.1   As a result of this refusal to sell, one frequent perception of 
holdouts is that their goal is to either “seek increased compensation” for their properties 
or to simply resist “new development in the area.”2  From the developer’s perspective, 
these holdouts boil down to opportunistic property owners’ seeking to capitalize on the 
fact that a developer’s inability to acquire any one property can effectively halt the entire 
development.3  Scholars have argued that this opportunistic gaming of circumstances, at 
times, prevents “socially desirable” transfers from occurring.4  
On the other hand, from the property owner’s perspective, he is often refusing to 
sell for a variety of non-monetary reasons, such as sentimental attachment to his home.5  
                                                        
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., magna cum laude, Fairfield University.  
Special thanks to Professor Angela Carmella for her guidance throughout the writing of this Comment.  
1 Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 101–02 (Md. 2014) (citing Mayor of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 
916 A.2d 324 (Md. 2007)).  
2 Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 495–96 (2005). 
3 Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 345 n.18. 
4 Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret 
Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (2006) (referencing existing owners who 
become aware of a larger project that requires their respective property and who subsequently hold out for 
“inflated prices”). 
5 Lucas J. Asper, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent Domain: "Just 
Compensation" or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 489, 491 (2007) (arguing that, “Subjective 
value in the home results from the personal dignity and social status that accompany homeownership, as 
well as the sentimental value an individual places on the home and surrounding land.”).  See also Brian 
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For instance, in a 2006 publicized episode illustrating the combination of both financial 
and non-financial rationale for refusing to sell to a large development, Vera Coking 
refused a $2 million offer from Donald Trump to purchase her Atlantic City property; in 
July 2014, this property had an auction reserve price of $199,000. 6   Ms. Coking’s 
grandson has stated that Ms. Coking does not regret the decision, because she did not 
view any of the offers as “reasonable”: “a few million dollars may sound like a lot, but 
it’s not for the place she loved.”7 
As an additional example of the non-monetary rationale for refusing to sell to a 
large development, the story of Edith Macefield, who was the alleged inspiration for the 
film UP, proves illustrative.8  Although her house later sold for $310,000 in March of 
2014, Ms. Macefield previously refused a $1 million offer from developers seeking to 
build a mall in Seattle, Washington.9  Ms. Macefield stated that she did not wish to make 
a grand statement by standing up to a large development, but rather, had strong 
sentimental attachment to the property.10 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 593, 595 (2013) (noting that, “[T]he owner of a house may have great sentimental attachment to the 
property because of happy memories of watching her children grow up there, but the market neither knows 
nor cares about her memories, so their value to her is not reflected in the property's market price. As a 
result, there is a substantial gap--a “subjective premium”--between the compensation that owners receive 
when they are paid the market value of their property and the substantially higher value that the owners 
themselves actually place on that property.”). 
6 Matt A.V. Chaban, A Homeowner’s Refusal To Cash Out In a Gambling Town Proves Costly, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 2014, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/nyregion/a-homeowner-who-
refused-to-cash-out-in-a-gambling-town-may-have-missed-her-chance.html. 
7 Id. 
8 Dominic Kelly, The Story of The Woman Who Turned Down $1 Million For Her Historic Seattle Home, 
OPPOSING VIEWS (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.opposingviews.com/i/society/story-woman-who-turned-
down-1-million-her-historic-seattle-home. 
9 Id. 
10Id. (quoting Ms. Macefield as stating: “Where would I go?  I don’t have any family and this is my home. 
My mother died here, on this very couch.  I came back to America from England to take care of her.  She 
made me promise I would let her die at home and not in some facility, and I kept that promise.  And this is 
where I want to die.  Right in my own home.  On this couch.”). 
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Thus, this Comment will analyze the competing and divergent ways in which 
holdouts and developers perceive each other.  Part II of the Comment discusses the case 
history of the eminent domain clause,11 starting with an analysis of the seminal cases in 
this area and culminating in a discussion of the most recent decisions from both state 
courts and the Supreme Court.12  This section additionally analogizes the holdouts in 
eminent domain proceedings for real property to those holdouts refusing to release 
covenants, through analysis of Rick v. West.13  Part III then examines and evaluates the 
various, recommended methods to circumvent or resolve a holdout situation, such as 
“secret buying agents” 14  and “land assembly districts.” 15   Part IV then proposes an 
additional, possible solution to the holdout problem as an alternative to eminent domain: 
alternative dispute resolution.  It first surveys both the evaluative and transformative 
mediation models.  This section then ultimately espouses that alternate dispute resolution, 
in the form of evaluative mediation that implements a Getting to Yes 16  principled 
negotiating framework, represents a transparent and efficient avenue to solutions for both 
the developer and the holdout property owner.  
II. History of Holdouts in Eminent Domain Proceedings 
A. Real Property Holdouts 
 Scholars have observed that the Supreme Court addressed the “connection 
between eminent domain and the holdout problem” in its very first decision involving the 
                                                        
11 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
14 Kelly, supra note 4, at 19. 
15 Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1469–70 (2008). 
16 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 
(Bruce M. Patton ed., 1981).  
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federal government’s implementation of its eminent domain power.17   The Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decisions in this area, up until Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,18 
“signaled that almost any governmental taking, including a taking involving a private 
transfer, would qualify as a legitimate public use.”19  
After Midkiff, the Supreme Court did not decide a “major public use case” for 
nearly twenty years.20  This occurred in the Kelo v. City of New London decision.21  In 
Kelo, nine owners of fifteen properties, including Susette Kelo, refused to sell to a 
development corporation22 that envisioned a plan to replace the homes with privately 
owned office buildings and a hotel in order to capitalize on a new research facility for a 
large pharmaceutical company.23  After having successfully negotiated with the majority 
of property owners within the planned development, city officials in New London argued 
that the condemnations were justifiable because of the extended condition of the city as a 
“depressed municipality.”24  In a split decision, the Court held the transfer of property 
from one private owner to another in the interest of economic development as a 
legitimate “public use.”25  Justice O’Connor’s dissent vigorously argued that this was 
much too expansive and that “all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and 
transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded.”26 
                                                        
17 Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875)). 
18 Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230–31 (1984)). 
19 Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Mark C. Landry, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain-A 
Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 430 (1985)). 
20 Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning 
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 516 (2006). 
21 Id. (citing Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 470 (2005)). 
22 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494–95. 
23 Id. at 474.  
24 Id. at 504.  The New London legislature characterized the city as a “depressed municipality” because of 
its “ailing economy.”  Id. At 469. 
25 Id. at 484–486. 
26 Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Under the banner of economic development, all 
private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it 
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In the immediate aftermath of Kelo, Ohio was the first state to confront the issue 
of “economic redevelopment takings.”27  In the case of Norwood v. Horney, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio refused to “extend state law to the extent allowed by Kelo.”28  Norwood 
dealt with a situation where a developer was predominantly able to have property owners 
within a potential development sell their property voluntarily, but a small minority 
refused to do so.29  In its ruling, the court emphasized the importance of individual 
property rights, which are thought “to be derived fundamentally from a higher authority 
and natural law,” and are “so sacred that they could not be entrusted lightly to ‘the 
uncertain virtue of those who govern.’”30   
In this case, a city sought to acquire property from existing owners and transfer it 
to another private entity as a part of an “urban renewal plan” for a “deteriorating area.”31  
The court declined to allow such a transfer through eminent domain, noting that  “judicial 
review of the taking is paramount” when the government seeks to seize private property 
and transfer it to another private entity.32  The court here observed that the commingling 
of the private and public interests in such cases creates the possibility that the 
government’s decision to impose eminent domain “may be influenced by the financial 
gains that would flow to it or to the private entity because of the taking.”33 
                                                                                                                                                                     
might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more 
beneficial to the public—in the process.”). 
27 Erik Stock, "We Were All Born on It. And Some of Us Was Killed on It": Adopting A Transformative 
Model in Eminent Domain Mediation, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 687, 691 (2008) (citing Ian Urbina, 
Ohio Supreme Court Rejects Taking of Homes for Project, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A18). 
28 Stock, supra note 27, at 691 (citing Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ohio 2006)). 
29 Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124–25. 
30 Id. at 1128 (citing Parham v. Justices of Decatur Cty. Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (Ga. 1851)). 
31 Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1115. 
32 Id. at 1139. 
33 Id. at 1140. 
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An additional case that serves to exemplify the use of eminent domain in holdout 
situations is a 2010 New York Court of Appeals ruling regarding Columbia University’s 
acquisition of land to expand its campus.34  The court in Matter of Kaur v. New York 
State Urban Dev. Corp. allowed Columbia to effectuate the taking of 17 acres for a 
satellite campus in West Harlem, New York. 35   The holdouts challenging the 
condemnation were several business owners within the zone of the potential development 
who contended that the blight findings that allowed the taking were illegitimate and “only 
serve[] the private interests of Columbia.”36  The court, however, reasoned that, since an 
earlier state decision held that the Brooklyn Nets basketball arena served a “public 
purpose,” then the educational promotion of Columbia University, although private, was 
also authorized as serving an equal, if not greater, “public purpose.” 37   The court 
favorably cited the anticipated, additional benefits of the campus in Harlem, including the 
development of two acres of park-like space, a stimulus to job growth in the local area 
through the anticipated hiring of 14,000 people for the construction site area, and 
upgrades to the overall transit infrastructure in Harlem.38  Scholarly interpretation of this 
decision argues that the standards for review and deference that the decision of the Court 
of Appeals of New York gave preserve the “tradition of broad eminent domain power in 
New York by limiting the judiciary’s power to invalidate state condemnations.”39 
Makowski v. Mayor and City of Baltimore provides an additional, even more 
recent example of the potential adverse outcomes that complete litigation can bring for a 
                                                        
34 Kaur v. New York State Urb. Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010). 
35 Id. at 724. 
36 Id. at 730. 
37 Id. at 734 (citing Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urb. Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. App. 
Div., 1st Dep’t. 2009)). 
38 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729. 
39 Matthew Pickel, Standing Pat in A Post-Kelo World: Preservation of Broad Eminent Domain Power in 
Kaur v. New York State Development Corp., 52 B.C. L. REV. 257, 259 (2011).  
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holdout in a condemnation proceeding.40  In this case, the city of Baltimore sought to 
immediately take possession of an existing property owner’s office building. 41   In 
recounting the facts that the trial level found, the Court of Appeals of Maryland drew 
attention to the history of the East Baltimore neighborhood that was the subject of the 
proceeding. 42   In particular, the court noted the neighborhood’s historic loss of 
manufacturing jobs, dating as far back as the 1950s and continuing the economic decline 
into the 1990s.43  This continued loss in jobs carried with it corresponding, deleterious 
impacts to the community, including substantial crime rates and population decreases, 
which collectively forced the neighborhood’s property values precipitously down and 
produced the image of East Baltimore as a “proverbial ghost town.”44 
As an initial effort to ameliorate these problems, Baltimore attempted to restore 
buildings within this zone on an individual basis.45  These efforts, however, did not work 
to effectively combat the “urban decay.”46  As a result of these ineffective initial efforts, 
the city refocused its efforts of rehabilitating the neighborhood to a more “comprehensive” 
plan, which aimed to achieve “massive revitalization.” 47   This plan focused on 
redeveloping eighty-eight acres near Johns Hopkins University Medical Center through 
the construction of buildings for such things as biotechnology research and senior 
housing.48 
                                                        
40 Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91 (Md. 2014). 
41 Id. at 92–94. 
42 Id. at 94–95. 
43 Id. at 94. 
44 Id. at 95. 
45 Id. at 94–95.  
46 Makowski, 94 A.3d at 95.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
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Before delving into the ultimate ruling in Makowski, it is sensible to first examine 
the cases to which the court cites in support of its ultimate ruling on this holdout 
situation: Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki49 and Sapero v. Mayor & 
City Council of Baltimore.50  Valsamaki involved a case concerning Baltimore’s attempt 
to use quick-take condemnation.51  The court held that the city must establish the reasons 
that require it to possess a respective property immediately.52  The court additionally 
stood for the proposition that an impasse in negotiations for a property as part of a 
development does not allow for quick-take condemnation, since regular condemnation 
that affords “procedural due process protections” is still available in that event. 53  
Furthermore, the court also examined the definition of a holdout and indicated that a 
failure to show the presence of a holdout situation in conjunction with the failure to show 
immediate necessity for possession would defeat a quick-take claim.54   
The Maryland Court of Appeals, two months after its decision in Valsamaki, 
again examined the idea of the holdout in a quick-title action in Sapero. 55   As in 
Valsamaki, the court in Sapero noted that there was potential for permitting a quick-take 
condemnation in the event of necessity, but held that the facts of the case, which 
demonstrated proposals that the city had received to redevelop the land, amongst other 
things, did not establish such necessity.56  Sapero additionally noted that the city’s lack of 
necessity manifested itself through its decision to stall continuing with condemnation 
                                                        
49 Mayor and City Council of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324 (Md. 2007) 
50 Sapero v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007). 
51 Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 326.  Quick-take condemnation allows a municipality to obtain “immediate 
possession and immediate title to a particular property.”  Id. at 327.   
52 Id. at 324.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 345 n.18.  
55 Makowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 94 A.3d 91, 104 (Md. 2014). 
56 Sapero v. Mayor of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007). 
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proceedings for over a year and instead going forward with the quick-take action that 
effectively “curtailed the property owner’s ability to present a defense.”57 
 Applying the same standards espoused in both Valsamaki and Sapero, the court 
in Makowski held that the presence of a holdout in this case warranted the use of quick-
take condemnation.58  The court observed that the property owner was indeed a holdout 
who made immediate possession necessary because the owner at issue was the only one 
in a block of over one hundred parcels of land who refused to sell, and his refusal 
obstructed the broader “urban renewal plan.”59  The court proceeded to declare that the 
existing owner “retained leverage to hold a hammer over the City in order to gain 
financial advantage.”60  As support for its assertion, the court noted that governments 
seeking to develop public projects suffer from unequal bargaining power as a result of 
public knowledge of the attempted acquisition of certain properties.61  
B. Residential Covenant Holdouts 
While the previous discussion focused primarily on cases of real property 
holdouts, the concept of holdouts extends beyond refusing to sell real property to refusing 
to release residential covenants.62  For instance, in the case of Rick v. West, the plaintiffs 
sought to force the defendant to release a covenant that restricted the respective land to 
single family dwelling status so that the plaintiffs could build a hospital.63  After the 
                                                        
57 Id. at 1076. 
58 Makowski, 94 A.3d at 102. 
59 Id. at 106 (citing Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be 
Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 468–69 (2003)). 
60 Makowski, 94 A.3d at 106. 
61 Id. at 105.  
62 Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
63 Id. at 196. 
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defendant refused, the court held that a covenant that provides a real benefit to the person 
seeking to use it is enforceable.64   
In so ruling, Rick v. West noted that the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest was free 
to decide that, as an “inducement to purchasers,” he would create the residential 
covenants.65  The court continued to assert that, since the defendant had established 
reliance on these covenants, the covenants would continue to have effect because “it is 
not a question of balancing equities or equating the advantages of a hospital on this site 
with the effect it would have on defendant’s property.”66  There is, however, a “reverse 
damages” scenario where “restrictive covenants should not be enforced unless the parties 
who seek enforcement pay compensation to the parties who maintain that changed 
conditions have rendered the restrictions unenforceable.”67  In addition, a current New 
York statute effectively renders unenforceable “non-substantial” restrictions on the use of 
land.68  
The situation in Rick v. West is, in a way, analogous to the large developer who 
seeks to take the land of an existing owner to put it to a supposedly better use for the 
public.69  The court in Rick v. West held that such a consideration of the competing 
equities to determine the supposed best societal use was not warranted.70  So, the question 
then becomes, what techniques are there to confront the “holdout” in either the real 
property or residential covenant context?71  
III. Comparative Survey and Analysis of Proffered Solutions 
                                                        
64 Id. at 201. 
65 Id. at 200. 
66 Id. 
67 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 933 n.1 (8th ed. 2014). 
68 Id. at 934 n.2 (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 951).  
69 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
70 Rick, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 200. 
71 See infra Part III.  
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A. Secret Purchasing Agents 
One proposed alternative to eminent domain for confronting a real property holdout 
situation is the use of secret purchasing agents.72  This proposal makes the observation 
that the government customarily must make use of its eminent domain power to avoid a 
holdout situation.73  The proposal observes, however, that private parties can circumvent 
the use of eminent domain through the use of undisclosed agents, which can make “the 
use of eminent domain for private parties unnecessary and indeed undesirable.”74 
Daniel Kelly, an advocate of this solution, notes that secret purchasing agents, as seen 
in the situation of a private party’s seeking to purchase the properties on a development 
plan, derive their foundational legitimacy from agency law.75   For agency law purposes 
in this area, the developer acts as the principal and authorizes the secret purchaser to act 
as an agent to deal with the third party existing owner.76   The way in which these 
purchases occur is through a “double-blind acquisition system,” where neither the 
existing owner nor the buying agent is aware of the larger development that would 
require the purchase of the property.77  This would potentially address a central issue of 
the holdout problem: differentiating between those existing owners who are refusing to 
sell in order to achieve an inflated price versus those who are not. 78   Since purely 
governmental use of eminent domain is “subject to democratic deliberation” and thus 
                                                        
72 Kelly, supra note 4, at 19.  
73 Id. at 1. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 21–22. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 20–21. 
78 Kelly, supra note 4, at 24. 
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becomes public knowledge, however, sovereign use of secret buying agents to forego 
eminent domain proceedings generally does not occur.79 
This proposed solution ultimately seeks to prevent “socially undesirable” transfers of 
land that might otherwise occur in certain circumstances where eminent domain is used 
to transfer land to private parties.80  These “inefficient transfers” occur because courts 
have no way of understanding an owner’s subjective value and instead rely on an 
objective metric: fair market value.81  This sometimes “socially undesirable” outcome, 
Kelly observes, also occurs in situations where “properties in a purportedly blighted 
neighborhood are valued more highly by the existing owners than by the assembler.”82  
There are notable examples of large-scale implementations of secret purchasing 
agents. 83   For instance, Harvard University, in an attempt to circumvent a potential 
holdout issue involving an existing property owner’s seeking an inflated price, used 
secret purchasing agents to purchase multiple parcels of land at a total cost of $88 
million.84  Likewise, Disney also used these agents to amass over one thousand acres of 
land for its theme parks.85  Disney primarily took advantage of the secret purchasing 
agents to “overcome potential strategic behavior among sellers.”86 
While these instances certainly provide illustrations of the potential efficacy of secret 
purchasing agents, there are also countervailing risks associated with the mechanism.87  
                                                        
79 Id. at 1. 
80 Id. at 25.  
81 Id. at 6–7. 
82 Id. at 58.  
83 Id. at 6. 
84 Kelly, supra note 4, at 6. 
85 Id. (citing Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers To Amass Land Stage for Kingdom, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K-2). 
86 Kelly, supra note 4, at 22–23 (citing Tim O'Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse, LEGAL 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at 2). 
87 Kelly, supra note 4, at 41–49. 
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These risks include: (1) foregoing positive externalities; (2) long durations of assembly 
and the possibility of collusion; and (3) distrust in the system.88  The use of purchasing 
agents will potentially fail to overcome disincentives to development in instances where 
the societal benefit is greater than the value of the properties of the existing owners, but 
where the private benefit is lower than the value of those properties.89  In these cases, the 
private party will not receive sufficient inducement to proceed with the development—
even with secret purchasing agents—and a project that would have a net societal benefit 
will not take place.90 
In addition, the use of secret purchasing agents carries with it an elongated bargaining 
process and the threat of collusion.91  For example, the use of secret purchasing agents is 
often a time-intensive process because it requires bargaining with each existing owner, 
whereas eminent domain allows for relatively instantaneous acquisitions. 92   While 
eminent domain still might require years of litigation,93 its use is potentially preferable to 
secret purchasing agents where the development necessitates expedience.94  Furthermore, 
there exists a possibility of collusion in the process between the agent and the existing 
owner where the agent, if cognizant of the larger development, could either inform the 
owner of the development or increase the price offer for a “kickback.”95 
                                                        
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 42.  
90 Kelly, supra note 4, at 42. 
91 Id. at 45–47. 
92 Id. at 45 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40–42 (2d ed. 1977); Richard A. 
Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owners: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 553, 572 (1993); Thomas Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 
1561, 1570 (1986) (book review)). 
93 Kelly, supra note 4, at 45.  
94 Id. at 46. 
95 Id. at 46–47. 
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Moreover, there exists the issue of creating general distrust in the system when 
developers administer secret purchasing agents.96  Since use of these agents is contrary to 
normal “full disclosure” negotiation, the practice has the potential to engender the 
perception of the developer as “deceptive.”97  In fact, when the owners discover the 
hidden developer, the negotiations often fail.98  Existing owners who find out that they 
have dealt with secret agents may subsequently lose their trust in future property 
transactions.99  This breakdown in trust can ultimately compel the developer to attempt to 
make costly amends with the community, such as where Harvard—in response to public 
censure of their use of secret purchasing agents—paid the government voluntarily.100  
Furthermore, even those who have not directly dealt with secret purchasing agents but 
become aware of their general existence may take “wasteful precautions” to determine 
whether a buyer is a secret purchasing agent.101   
B. Land Assembly Districts 
Another proposed alternative to eminent domain for dealing with the holdout issue is 
known as the “land assembly district” (“LAD”).102  This solution aims to provide a way 
in which property assemblages can occur “without harming the poor and powerless,” 
which is the type of harm that advocates of the proposal believe eminent domain can do 
in certain instances.103  The advocates of this mechanism note that holdouts pose the 
                                                        
96 Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–49. 
97 Id. at 47. 
98 Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468. 
99 Kelly, supra note 4, at 47. 
100  Id. at 47–48 (citing See Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions Thawing as Harvard Earns Allston's 
Trust: University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2003, at B3). 
101 Kelly, supra note 4, at 48. 
102 Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468. 
103 Id. at 1467. 
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problem of “underassembly” in private property transactions.104  This issue occurs where 
a developer values a parcel of a desired assembly higher than the individual owner of that 
parcel contained within that assembly, but that owner nevertheless strategically seeks a 
higher price thereby diminishing the interest of the developer to assemble the properties 
at all.105   
While the government has the power of eminent domain to deal with this issue, 
scholars note that eminent domain proceedings can result in “confiscatory 
condemnations” 106  and often do not compensate the owner with any “subjective 
surplus.” 107   The proposal seeks to have the law “retrofit a community with a 
condominium-like structure.”108  The LAD formation and approval would be subject to a 
process “substantially parallel to those involved in existing redevelopment and 
condemnation procedures,” but the approving commission would need to “certify that a 
LAD is necessary to overcome the problem of excess fragmentation.”109  This structure 
would place a community into a district that would require a majority vote to approve the 
sale of the district to a “developer or municipality seeking to consolidate the land into a 
single parcel.”110   Scholars contend that this would circumvent the holdout situation 
because the owners would be subject to a “collective voting procedure.”111 
While this proposal certainly has the potential to mitigate the holdout problem, it too 
brings corresponding concerns.  For instance, there exists the risk of “majoritarian 
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tyranny” due to the voting schematic of the proposal that requires a majority decision.112  
This structure threatens minority property owners, as the majority may “enact rules solely 
benefiting itself at the expense of a minority for no better reason than that the majority 
can hold together a coalition of the selfish.”113  Additionally, the majority may vote for a 
given assembly when other property owners within it would not do so.114  The constituent 
elements of the district’s majority may additionally be corporate entities, such as real 
estate investment funds, which may by their nature perceive the district as a strict 
investment endeavor and fail to account for the subjective valuation of any individual 
property. 115   Furthermore, those with “transient” interests within the district could 
potentially “gang up on owners with deep connections to their parcels.”116  Thus, while 
LADs offer a democratic mechanism to confront the holdout issue in the real property 
setting as an alternative to eminent domain, it may run the risk of failing to adequately 
protect the interests of the minority within the district.117 
Each of the proposed solutions above offers theoretically attractive alternatives to the 
use of eminent domain for dealing with the holdout situation.  Without more widespread 
acceptance of secret purchasing agents and in the absence of the creation of LADs, 
however, an already available alternative that has proven itself as a highly effective tool 
in numerous other areas will provide a practical solution to the problem: mediation. 
IV. Proposal for Mediation That Uses Principled Framework 
A. Mediation Benefits  
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The notion of dissuading traditional litigation is not a novel one, as both federal 
judges and American Presidents have noted the potential drawbacks of proceeding to 
trial.118  Abraham Lincoln, for instance, exhorted the following: “Discourage litigation.  
Persuade your clients to compromise whenever you can.  Point out to them how the 
nominal winner is often the real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time.” 119  
Furthermore, and more specifically for purposes of this Comment, the notion of alternate 
dispute resolution in the context of eminent domain proceedings is also well established, 
as the use of a form of arbitration existed as long ago as in the 1660s.120   
 An additional form of alternate dispute resolution used in eminent domain 
proceedings, mediation, consists of an independent mediator engaging with the 
government and the existing owner in order to have both parties come to terms with an 
agreement that both sides find suitable.121  The mediation session is dependent on the will 
of the parties and can occur at any stage that the parties reach an agreement to do so.122  
In this circumstance, the mediator functions to “facilitate communication between the 
parties, identify their respective interests, and, hopefully, help them resolve the issues on 
terms with which both can live.”123  At the mediation session, both parties, with legal 
representation, join the mediator.124  The format of the mediation is subject to tailoring 
and variation to fit the needs of the parties.125  The process of the mediation consists first 
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of a joint session with the parties and mediator together.126  Then, the mediator conducts 
separate caucuses with each party.127  At these caucuses, the mediator separately conveys 
offers between the parties through “shuttle diplomacy.”128  Ultimately, the goal is to have 
the mediator join the parties again to write and sign a settlement agreement.129 
 The advantages to mediation include high reports of settlement, low costs, 
increased confidentiality, and a greater degree of control. 130   Settlement rates for 
mediation in general come in at approximately 80%, with the settlement rate for eminent 
domain mediations tracking closely to that figure, albeit with a small sample size of 
reported settlements.131  For instance, this sample consists of a mediator in Tennessee 
who has conducted eminent domain mediations and approximates the settlement rate of 
his cases at around 80%.132   
Furthermore, mediation foregoes the costs associated with litigation, including the 
potentially sizeable expenses of “pretrial attorney fees and costs arising from discovery, 
depositions, transcripts, motions, briefs, research, experts and witnesses.”133  The slow 
nature of the litigation process further compounds these costs, which increase over 
time. 134   Eminent domain litigation costs additionally include “negative public 
perception.”135  In contrast, mediation is “far less expensive,” allows the cost of the 
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mediator to be shared equally amongst the parties, and is generally less time 
consuming.136   
 Moreover, mediation offers increased confidentiality, whereas litigation is often 
an “extremely public process.”137  This confidentiality comes about as a result of statutes 
that prohibit the admission of evidence concerning the mediation.138  Statutes also view 
the information presented to the mediator as protected.139  Furthermore, the parties can 
add further confidentiality protection through any agreed upon contract stipulations.140   
 The voluntary nature of mediation allows the parties to exert significant control 
over the way in which the process occurs.141  The parties are not obligated to follow 
“court-mandated procedures” and instead have the freedom to define their own 
process.142  Since the process is voluntary, the parties can reach a compromise.143  This is 
in contrast to litigation, where the judgment at trial will create a “winner and loser.”144  
Furthermore, the parties exert autonomy when they choose the mediator of the dispute.145  
B. Examples of the Use of Mediation to Avoid Eminent Domain Proceedings 
 A recent example of the use of mediators to avoid eminent domain litigation is the 
attempt of Vermont Gas Systems to run pipeline through various private properties.146  
After failing to reach an agreement with a minority percentage of the affected property 
owners for the easements, the company offered those owners the opportunity to conduct 
                                                        
136 Ferguson, supra note 118, at 45. 




141 Ferguson, supra note 118, at 44. 
142 Leasure & Gosack, supra note 121. 
143 Ferguson, supra note 118, at 44. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Associated Press, Vermont Gas Offers Landowners Mediation, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2014, available 
at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/13/vermont-gas-offers-landowners-mediation/.  
 20 
mediations with third-party mediators. 147   A spokesperson for Vermont Gas lauded 
mediation as an attractive alternative to eminent domain litigation because it is “quicker 
and generally cheaper.”148   
 Another example of the successful use of mediation to forego eminent domain 
proceedings is found in Fort Smith, Arkansas. 149   The city made substantial use of 
mediation in its efforts to acquire various properties “for expansion of a regional water-
supply lake.”150  Before beginning the mediations, the town informed the landowners that 
the city would pay for the cost of the mediator in order to “encourage participation.”151  
In the group sessions of the mediations, the city made sure to inform the property owners 
of the regional benefits of the project as well as the city’s intention to be fair during the 
negotiations.152  The mediations were so uniformly successful that every session resulted 
in settlement.153   
C.  Proposal for Transformative Model 
 One type of proposed mediation as an alternative to eminent domain proceedings 
is based on the “transformative” method.154  This proposal recognizes that mediation in 
general may address “problematic power imbalances inherent in any eminent domain 
dispute.”155   The transformative model, along with the “facilitative” and “evaluative” 
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models, is a “generally accepted mediation [model].” 156   The transformative model 
consists of the least involved mediator, while the evaluative process implements the most 
involved mediator of these three models.157  In the transformative process, the mediator 
does not unilaterally establish the way in which the mediation will occur, but rather seeks 
input from the parties as to how to organize the session.158  To foster and encourage 
“engagement” between the parties, the transformative mediator makes use of 
unstructured questioning without suggesting the answer beforehand.” 159   While the 
mediator here is minimally involved, he will nevertheless draw attention to points in the 
discussion where one party “recognizes and acknowledges the perspective of the 
other.”160   
The proposal for transformative mediation espouses that model specifically in the 
eminent domain context because the minimal involvement of the transformative mediator 
may lead to maintenance of the relationship between the parties.161  An advocate of the 
proposal, Erik Stock, notes that the mediator who implements a transformative 
methodology seeks “to foster opportunities for the disputants to experience empowerment 
and recognition.”162  The transformative model, Stock argues, will allow the existing 
owner in an eminent domain proceeding to feel “empowerment.”163  According to Stock, 
the use of the transformative model is particularly appealing in this context because 
eminent domain cases frequently involve parties located in “neighborhoods lacking in 
political power,” and the transformative model affords those parties an opportunity to 
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“gain a voice in a dispute where they might otherwise have none and reconnect to the 
government entity involved in the dispute.”164   
Stock goes on to cite the Uniform Mediation Act as reinforcement for the 
transformative model, since that Act emphasizes “self-determination” in order to create a 
sense of equity and satisfaction with the mediation proceeding.165  This transformative 
dynamic, according to Stock, is potentially useful because it necessitates cooperation 
where there can be a large “emotional and psychic” discrepancy between the property 
owner and the government in eminent domain cases.166  Furthermore, Stock contends that, 
on a more macro level, the transformative model will preserve the relationship between 
property owners and the government by engendering “democratic values” which the 
scholar deems potentially greater than reaching a settlement.167    Stock’s conclusion 
emphasizes the process value of mediation, where if the property owner feels a sense of 
“empowerment” while dealing with the government through a robust level of control in 
the mediation itself, then the use of the transformative method is justified.168  
D. Argument for an Evaluative Model of Mediation to Avoid Eminent Domain 
Litigation 
 While the proposal of a transformative model certainly has appealing and 
meritorious characteristics, including the process empowerment of the existing owner as 
discussed supra,169 a holdout situation may call for more active involvement from the 
mediator in an effort to reach a settlement.  This active involvement is a chief feature of 
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evaluative mediation—indeed, it consists of the highest level of mediator involvement of 
the three primary mediation models. 170   Whereas a transformative mediator takes a 
predominantly hands-off approach in an effort to bestow upon the parties a sense of 
control over the mediation process, an evaluative mediator focuses much more on the 
outcome of the mediation and “will not only encourage settlement, but will at times 
propose a particular outcome for the dispute.”171 
In general, an evaluative mediator “focuses on the legal rights of the parties and 
evaluates the merits of each party’s claim.” 172   A mediator who implements this 
methodology seeks to address the fundamental origin of the controversy.173  While this 
technique engenders a “more practical focus than in a purely facilitative mediation,” it 
does not do so to neglect either side’s interests.174   
A core competency of the evaluative model is the ability of the mediator to act as 
an “agent of reality” for the parties. 175   The evaluative mediator acts as such when 
providing objective and neutral advice.176  The mediator in this evaluative capacity seeks 
to reach a settlement by overcoming “unrealistic opinions about the value of their claims” 
that either party may have.177  To accomplish this end, an evaluative mediator “provides 
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new information, helps parties realize the costs and risks of litigation, and points out 
weaknesses and strengths of each side.”178 
More specifically in the eminent domain context, an evaluative mediator provides 
the parties with “opinions on any of the many issues which arise in eminent domain 
matters, including the potential outcome at trial.”179  The evaluative mediator in this 
context may also candidly assess the costs and benefits of proceeding to litigate the 
issue.180  During this discussion, the evaluative mediator may choose to present a “verdict 
range” that incorporates the probability of potential outcomes within that realm of 
possibilities.181  Since an evaluative mediator has this ability to offer opinions on the 
matter, the use of an “experienced mediator with eminent domain expertise” serves to 
enhance the session.182   
E. Incorporating Principled Framework to Evaluative Model 
This Comment proposes that a principled negotiating framework based on the 
seminal book Getting to Yes183 will augment the efficacy of evaluative mediation in the 
eminent domain context.  Scholars have referred to this work as the “Bible for 
cooperative negotiations and generally a very useful blueprint for mediation.”184   The 
main precepts of the work are: “1) separating the people from the problem, 2) focusing on 
                                                        
178 Roberts, supra note 172, at 196. 
179 Stanley Leasure, Eminent Domain Disputes: The Role of Mediation, RIGHT OF WAY, Mar./Apr. 2012, at 
32–34, available at 
https://www.irwaonline.org/eweb/upload/web_mar_apr12_EminentDomainMediation.pdf. 
180 Id. at 34.  
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 33. 
183 Fisher & Ury, supra note 16. 
184 John Barkai, What's A Cross-Cultural Mediator to Do? A Low-Context Solution for a High-Context 
Problem, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 43, 81 (2008). 
 25 
interests not positions, 3) inventing options for mutual gain, and 4) using objective 
criteria.”185 
1. Separating the People from the Problem 
As to the first principle of “separating the people from the problem,” the book 
notes that, “The ability to see the situation as the other side sees it, as difficult as it may 
be, is one of the most important skills a negotiator can possess.”186   This ability to 
analyze the situation from both sides underscores the evaluative mediator’s goal of 
objective assessment of the root causes of the case.187  Furthermore, while this principle 
recommends focusing on the problem itself, it does not disregard the emotions of the 
parties involved and advises negotiators to “deal with the people as human beings.”188  
Since emotions on the part of the potential holdouts have the tendency to run high,189 the 
evaluative mediator would be prudent to heed the advice of this principle and recognize 
these human emotions at the mediation session, while maintaining a simultaneous but 
separate focus on the problem, as the principle suggests.  
The use of this principle is highly complementary to evaluative mediation, which 
emphasizes the role of the mediator as bringing objective and neutral reality to the 
parties. 190   Conversely, this principle is at odds with the precepts of transformative 
mediation, which does not separate the people from the problem but instead seeks to have 
the parties feel empowerment over the problem.191  The use of evaluative mediation with 
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the application of this principle is preferable to the transformative model in the eminent 
domain context because, while it would address the emotional element192 of potentially 
selling one’s property, it would not allow these emotions to create  “unrealistic opinions 
about the value of their claims” that would conceivably interfere with settlement.193  For 
instance, in the example of Vera Coking, who turned down an offer to sell her property 
for $2 million to Donald Trump only to ultimately have the property receive an auction 
reserve price of approximately $1.8 million less than that offer,194 an evaluative mediator 
would have acted as an “agent of reality” to make Ms. Coking aware of this potential 
precipitous price decrease as well as the objective assessment of the offer at the time it 
was made.195   
By adhering to this principle, the evaluative mediator would also be able to avoid 
the potential issue of distrust in the system related to the secret purchasing agent 
proposal. 196   That proposal would effectively remove the people from the problem 
through the use of undisclosed purchasing agents so as to not make an existing owner 
aware of a larger development plan, but this practice is often seen as “deceptive.”197  
Indeed, property owners who come to realize that they have transacted with undisclosed 
agents may suffer from a breakdown in trust in future property dealings. 198   This 
“separating the people from the problem” principle seeks to accomplish just what it 
claims, however: it untangles the issue at hand from emotion, but does not wholly remove 
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the human component.199  Thus, the evaluative mediator implementing this principle 
would not have to rely on deception, as is the potential case with the use of secret 
purchasing agents. 200   In order to achieve a positive outcome for the parties, the 
evaluative mediator can still objectively assess the merits of each party’s position without 
conflating the problem with emotion.201  This would forego the potential costs to the 
secret purchasing agent proposal, including the monetary costs associated with making a 
financial apology to the community, as was the case with the Harvard example,202 and the 
costs associated with precautionary assessments of whether a buyer is a secret purchasing 
agent.203  
2. Focus on Interests  
As to the second principle of “focusing on interests not positions,” the book 
asserts that, “a close examination of the underlying interests will reveal the existence of 
many more interests that are shared or compatible than ones that are opposed.”204  This 
focus on interests by the evaluative mediator would lend itself to separating those 
property owners who are holding out for opportunistic reasons from those holding out for 
non-monetary reasons.205  For instance, the evaluative mediator would aim to objectively 
determine whether someone like Edith Macefield actually imputes a sentimental premium 
on the value of a given property, is simply strategically seeking a higher price knowing 
that her property is essential to the larger development scheme, or is indeed simply 
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attempting to make some sort of grand statement against the development itself.206  As 
another example, in the Columbia University expansion case, the evaluative mediator 
would actively seek to establish whether the business owner holdouts in that case truly 
believed the area was not blighted,207 or whether their true interest for holding out was 
strategic in nature.  
This is an additional and appealing, distinguishing characteristic of evaluative 
mediation implementing this principle from the transformative model, since the 
transformative mediator would simply focus on creating the feeling of empowerment 
amongst the parties.208  While there is a strong argument that this emphasis on the process 
will enable the parties to feel a greater sense of control over the mediation,209 the session 
may very well conclude without an objective third party’s determining the reasoning 
behind the refusal to sell, which is the precise determination that this focus on interests 
promotes.210  This would ultimately better enable the evaluative mediator in the active 
promotion of settlement.211  
3. Inventing Options for Mutual Gain 
Moreover, in reference to the third principle of “inventing options for mutual 
gain”, the book notes that, “[i]n a complex situation, creative inventing is an absolute 
necessity.  In any negotiation it may open doors and produce a range of potential 
agreements satisfactory to each side.”212  The potential efficacy of the application of this 
principle is seen in the result in Rick v. West, a case in which the construction of a 
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hospital did not occur because of a holdout’s enforcement of a residential covenant.213  
The court held that it would not conduct a balancing of the potential benefits of a hospital 
with the potential burden imposed on the covenant holder if it were not enforced, but 
would instead focus on whether the covenant-created reliance was an “inducement to 
purchasers.”214  In a case like this, an evaluative mediator implementing this principle 
would attempt to come up with a broad range of possible solutions215 that could have 
produced the ostensibly favorable result of the construction of a hospital, such as possibly 
giving the holder of the restrictive covenant some interested stake in the new hospital for 
releasing the covenant.  In addition, the evaluative mediator could use his active 
involvement in the mediation to create solutions based on the purported benefits of the 
development, such as in Matter of Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 
where an evaluative mediator could potentially have based a number of creative solutions 
on the litany of potential benefits of Columbia University’s expansion, such as its 
creation of thousands of jobs and benefits to the local transit system and environment.216 
This is another chief advantage of evaluative mediation over its transformative 
counterpart, since the more active involvement of the evaluative mediator is more 
conducive to the creation of different, possible solutions, as opposed to the general 
passivity of the transformative mediator.217  Furthermore, the evaluative mediator could 
also present the parties with a probability analysis of these outcomes if a trial is needed as 
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a backdrop to any other possible, devised solutions so as to convey the possible risks 
involved with each solution.218 
4. Establishment of Objective Criteria  
Finally, Getting to Yes encourages establishing “objective criteria” upon which to 
base the negotiations.219  This criteria, the book argues, should consider “standards of 
fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit.” 220   This principle complements the risk-
assessment and opinion-providing function of the evaluative mediator221 by underscoring 
the need to establish an objective basis for that judgment.   
One such possible criteria to assist the evaluative mediator’s creation of a “verdict 
range” 222  would be the use of past holdout case results.  For instance, Kelo could 
potentially provide caution to the holdout who is considering creating an impasse at 
mediation, as the Supreme Court, albeit in a split decision, asserted the transfer of 
property from one private owner to another in the interest of economic growth to be a 
permissible “public use.”223  Similarly, Makowski illustrates another example of a case 
result that the evaluative mediator could use as an objective benchmark to provide 
admonition to a would-be holdout.  There, the court provided guidance as to who 
constitutes a holdout and ultimately held that the refusal to sell in that case amounted to 
interference with the more comprehensive “urban renewal plan” at issue and thus 
warranted condemnation.224   
                                                        
218 Leasure, supra note 179, at 34. 
219 Fisher & Ury, supra note 16, at 83.  
220 Id. 
221 See supra notes 179–181. 
222 Leasure, supra note 179, at 34. 
223 Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 484–486 (2005). 
224 Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 101–02 (Md. 2014). 
 31 
Conversely, the evaluative mediator could juxtapose these potential outcomes 
with the result in Norwood, which held that condemnation was not warranted in a case 
where a municipality attempted to obtain private property and transfer it to another 
private party in order to ostensibly revitalize the city, with the court noting that this raises 
the possibility of improper financial benefits to the city or to the private party to which 
the property is ultimately transferred. 225   Thus, these case results could provide the 
evaluative mediator with the tools necessary to establish the type of “objective criteria” 
that Getting to Yes espouses.226 
V. Conclusion 
  This Comment began with a definition of a holdout as a landowner who resists 
or refuses to sell to a larger development.  These holdouts are often subject to eminent 
domain proceedings to effectuate the development.  As discussed, various alternatives to 
eminent domain exist to deal with the holdout issue, including secret purchasing agents 
and land assembly districts. This Comment then advanced evaluative mediation as a 
beneficial approach to dealing with holdouts due to this model’s emphasis on mediator 
activity and settlement.  
The proposal centered on the general appeal of mediation, including the cost and 
control advantages compared to traditional litigation of eminent domain cases.  More 
specifically, though, this Comment argued that evaluative mediation is better-suited to 
reach the needed settlements in eminent domain cases through the ability of the mediator 
to actively provide evaluations of the matter, distinguished from the general passivity of a 
transformative mediator.  This Comment then offered a Getting to Yes principled 
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negotiating framework to complement and enhance this evaluative mediation.  Using this 
framework, the mediator will have a strong basis upon which to both conduct the process 
of these potentially highly emotional holdout cases as well as to provide an independent 
opinion of the case based on objective criteria. 
